Background
In the Introduction to the recent text Troelstra and Schwichtenberg [44] , the authors contrast structural proof theory on the one hand with interpretational proof theory on the other. They write thus.
Structural proof theory is based on a combinatorial analysis of the structure of formal proofs; the central methods are cut elimination and normalization.
In interpretational proof theory the tools are (often semantically motivated) syntactic translations of one formal theory in another.
We are left in no doubt that proof theory as currently practised is essentially syntactic in nature. Indeed proof theory has been the poor relation of logic, at least partly for this very reason. So the reference to semantic motivation is tantalising and should give one pause.
Reflecting on the notion of semantic motivation, one might crudely distinguish between philosophical and mathematical motivation. In the first case one tries to convince with a telling conceptual story; in the second one relies more on the elegance of some emergent mathematical structure. If there is a tradition in logic it favours the former, but I have a sneaking affection for the latter. Of course the distinction is not so clear cut. Elegant mathematics will of itself tell a tale, and one with the merit of simplicity. This may carry philosophical weight. But that cannot be guaranteed: in the end one cannot escape the need to form a judgement of significance.
Let us first consider interpretational proof theory. I urge an understanding of the notion of interpretation in logic along the lines of the following slogan.
INTERPRETATION = MODEL + CODING.
By coding I mean that aspect of logic which deals with representability (whether of functions or of mathematical arguments) in a formal system. If one leaves that aside, one has just the model which is the mathematical idea in the interpretation. Such an idea may well arise from philosophical considerations, but it may equally constitute or give rise to interesting mathematical structure.
Gödel's Dialectica interpretation [23] represents a particularly interesting example of the contrast between philosphical and mathematical motivation. The metamathematical applications mentioned in Gödel's 1941 Princeton lecture 'In what sense is intuitionistic logic constructive?' (reproduced in [16] ) may have been the original motivation, but Gödel himself appears to have moved towards the position that his interpretation was fundamentally of philosophical interest.
1 Be that as it may, the metamathematical and the philosophical issues are distinct from the abstract mathematical properties of the interpretation. These mathematical properties are themselves curious and I shall devote much of this paper to explaining them.
Turning now to structural proof theory, one may wonder whether it is really so free of semantic content. Experience of constructive proofs suggests otherwise. Two different points of view are represented by [22] and [31] : certainly there is a syntactic approach, and issues that demand it, but there appears to be more than that. Things become more problematic in the case of classical proof but still it is natural to hope for some semantic understanding of some of the central methods. While there has been much stress lately on studying the 'dynamics of proofs', there are still things to be done at a simpler level. Semantic motivation in the mathematical sense challenges structural proof theory to give a mathematically interesting account of the structure of propositions and proofs.
Categorical Proof Theory is one modern approach to the issue of mathematical structure in the two branches of proof theory. The subject arose out of the well known connections between constructive logic and typed lambda calculus 2 (Girard et al [22] give a succinct account) and typed lambda calculus and cartesian closed categories (see Lambek and Scott [30] for example). There is little systematic in the literature, though Girard's Linear Logic has succesfully been treated from this point of view (see amongst others Seely [36] de Paiva [12] Benton et al [1] [2], Bierman [3] [4] ). Probably the best overall impression of Categorical Proof Theory is given by work in the related area of Categorical Type Theory (for which see Crole [9] , Jacobs [26] , Taylor [40] ). The main idea of Categorical Proof Theory is to represent propositions and proofs in some logical system as the objects and maps in some structured category. Any interesting version requires some non-trivial notion of equality of proofs. With that in place, the proof theory itself corresponds to the initial structured category. This perspective has been reasonably successful in the case of constructive and linear proofs, providing both a clear explanation of structure and clean approaches to the proof of metamathematical results. At the end of this paper I make a suggestion as to how to regard classical proofs from this point of view.
Of course besides the initial syntactic model there are many other structured categories which can be read as models for a given style of proof theory. We can think of these as providing other worlds of propositions and proofs. Since interpretational proof theory itself provides structured categories corresponding to the mathematical models, the question of semantics of proofs brings these two sides of proof theory together. That is one of the merits of Categorical Proof Theory: it is a kind of 'Proof Theory in the Abstract'. This paper contains a number of loosely linked sections. I start by discussing aspects of the Dialectica interpretation from the point of view of Categorical Proof Theory. I thereby pay tribute to Troelstra's work on this interpretation over many years. His contributions are technical as in [42] and conceptual as in the contributions to Gödel's Collected works [17] and [16] . In respect of both, the community of logicians is much in his debt. Another reason for discussing the Dialectica interpretation is that of all the standard functional interpretations it is the most riddling and hence the one for which the possibility of the abstract analysis of the kind I wish to promote is least obvious. So I hope to give prominence to the existence of such an analysis by the discussion in Section 2. An abstract view of proofs is particularly revealing for the so-called DillerNahm variant of the Dialectica interpretation. I consider this in some detail in Section 3, as the excellent structural properties of this interpretation deserve wider recognition.
I then go on to consider some possibilities for a theory of classical proof. From the point of view of structural proof theory, the picture today is something like this. On the one hand constructive proof theory looks in good shape. The syntactic representations of proofs can be read as intelligible mathematical descriptions: at one simple level as maps in a cartesian closed category. So we have a good categorical proof theory. 3 On the other hand it used to be said that classical proof theory does not really exist. Two distinct thoughts lie behind this conclusion.
• Suppose that C is a cartesian closed category with initial object 0 such that the contravariant functor (− ⇒ 0) is an involution. Then C is equivalent to a boolean algebra. (This elementary point is attributed to Joyal.) Thus any attempt to build on the theory of constructive proof in terms of a cartesian closed category by adding a strict notion of falsity and requiring an involution (that is ¬¬A ∼ = A) is doomed to triviality: proof reduces to provability.
• In the classical sequent calculus the process of cut elimination cannot usefully be taken as a computation process preserving meaning of proofs. (I believe this is discussed in Lafont's dissertation [27] .) Given any sequent calculus proofs π 1 and π 2 of Γ ⊢ ∆ one has a proof
using Weakening and Cut. (There are also some implicit Contractions.) Eliminating the Cut one gets either π 1 or π 2 . So if cut elimination preserved meaning all proofs of Γ ⊢ ∆ would be equal.
In response to the first point it is natural to ask what happens if we relax the conditions given. Double negation translations already provide one answer, albeit one which relies on a coding into constructive proof theory. I give the standard category theoretic account of these in Section 4, and investigate what happens when one applies the ideas to the usual Dialectica and Diller-Nahm interpretations. The disadvantages with this approach are that the symmetry of classical logic is lost, and that the interpretation appears coding dependent.
The second of the points is usually glossed by referring to the essential nondeterminism of classical proof. There are two natural kinds of response to that. On the one hand one can regard classical propositions as being inherently ambiguous, that ambiguity being resolved by a finer analysis of propositions. Many finer propositions will correspond to one coarse classical proposition, and the proof theory of the more refined propositions will be deterministic. This approach has been investigated in the context of Linear Logic (Girard [19] ) by Girard [20] [21] , and by Schellinx [35] and others (see in particular [10] ). On the other hand one can embrace the non-determinism, and regard the sequent calculus as a kind of process calculus with implicit choice (as between π 1 and π 2 above). This idea is obvious enough, but it is hard to give it shape: recent work on structural proof theory by Bierman and his student Urban does just that ( [46] , see also their [47] and Urban's PhD dissertation [45] ). At the end of Section 5, I briefly consider this approach from the point of view of Categorical Proof Theory. Linear Logic is again involved though in a rather different way. Troelstra himself was quick to appreciate the potential of Linear Logic (as witnessed by the books [43] , [44] and also the important dissertation of Schellinx [35] ), so I first try to indicate why a categorical analysis of the sequent calculus makes Linear Logic inevitable by sketching an approach to some very basic theorems in Categorical Proof Theory. I close by explaining what I think is the crucial difficulty in the semantic analysis of classical proof.
I am happy to acknowledge the use of (an old version of) Paul Taylor's diagram macros and of his prooftree macros in the preparation of this paper.
The Dialectica Interpretation
Gödel lectured on his Dialectica interpretation at Yale in 1941, but the published paper [23] did not appear until 1958. 4 In this section I explain an abstract form of the Dialectica interpretation and analyze its mathematical structure. The main points come from de Paiva's PhD dissertation [11] (for a succinct account see de Paiva [12] and for related work de Paiva [13] ). It is appropriate to remark at this time that the analysis given by de Paiva owes more than may be apparent to Troelstra [42] . In a recent survey paper [48] van Oosten expresses his feeling that the categorical analyses of realizability owe a lot to the systematic treatment of realizability interpretations in Troelstra [42] . I certainly think that is correct.
5 Similarly, without the stimulus of Troelstra's treatment in [42] of the Dialectica interpretation in parallel with other forms of functional interpretation, the motivation to study the structure from the point of view of Categorical Proof Theory would have been entirely lacking.
The Dialectica Category
Suppose that we have a category T which we can think of as interpreting some type theory; and suppose that over the category T we have a pre-ordered fibration p : P → T, which we can regard as providing for each I ∈ T a pre-ordered collection of (possibly non-standard) predicates P(I) = (P(I), ⊢). Starting with this data we construct a new category Dial = Dial(p) which we regard as a category of propositions and proofs. We do this as follows.
• The objects A of Dial are U, X ∈ T together with α ∈ P(U × X). We write this in text as A = (U α ←− X) and in displays as
Our understanding of the predicate α is not symmetric as regards U and X: we read U α ←− X as ∃u.∀x.α(u, x), in accord with the form of propositions in the image of the Dialectica interpretation.
• Maps of Dial from A = (U [17] and [16] . 5 Indeed in my first lectures on the Effective Topos I started the course by explaining a categorical view of the realizability interpretation of higher order arithmetic (HAω) using the effective operations along Troelstra's lines. And after that, the passage from Troelstra's systematic treatment of functional interpretations of HAS to the topos theoretic point of view is really one of relatively straightforward abstraction.
One should think of this as saying that a proof of ∃u∀xα → ∃v∀yβ is obtained by transforming to ∀u∃v∀y∃x(α → β) and then Skolemizing along the lines explained by Troelstra [42] (see also [17] ).
So the composite is indeed a map A → C of Dial.
It is straightforward to check the associativity and identity laws, so we get the following.
Proposition 2.1 Dial forms a category.
Let us call Dial the Dialectica category; it encapsulates in a pure form the basic mathematical feature of the Dialectica interpretation, namely its interpretation of implication. 6 The point of view of Categorical Proof Theory is that to treat the Dialectica interpretation as a theory of proofs is to study the categorical structure of Dial.
Natural Structure
In this section I describe structure on the Dialectica category Dial which is an easy consequence of simple assumptions about the propositional fibration p : P → T. This resulting structure is natural in the categorical sense that it is given by natural transformations; and it is the structure of Intuitionistic Linear Logic. (The basic references are Girard [19] , [22] and [43] ; for categorical analyses see Seely [36] , Hyland and de Paiva [25] , and in particular for the Intuitionistic version Benton et al [1] [2], and Bierman [3] [4]). In the next section I shall discuss that further structure which on the one hand is needed for the applications to constructive logic, but on the other is not (at least in the technical sense) so natural.
Propositional Logic
Let us start with the simplest condition. Suppose that p : P → T is a product fibration, that is T has finite products and the fibres P(I) have finite products preserved by reindexing. 7 Then we have the following. Proposition 2.2 Dial carries the structure of a symmetric monoidal category.
Proof. The tensor product
The unit I for this tensor is I = (1 true ←− 1) . The unit and associativity structure is 6 In fact as first pointed out by Girard one can regard Dial as arising (as a category of coalgebras) from a more primitive category. So at a formal level there is yet more to say. For details see de Paiva [12] . 7 So p : P → T is a map of finite product categories, and the fibration models simple conjunctive logic.
obvious.
To go beyond simple tensor logic we need some function spaces. From now on we shall assume at least the following structure.
• T is cartesian closed. We write 1 for the terminal object, X × Y for the product of X and Y , and (Y ⇒ Z) = Z Y for the object of functions from Y to Z (usually called the function space).
• p : P → T is a fibration over T of (preordered) cartesian closed categories:
that is, each fibre has terminal object, products and function spaces and reindexing preserves the structure. We use the standard logical notation ⊤, ∧, → for this structure.
Thus our ruling assumption is that T models the simply typed lambda calculus, and each P(I) models ⊤, ∧, → logic.
Theorem 2.3 With our ruling assumption, Dial is symmetric mononoidal closed.
Proof.
It is easy to check the adjunction
According to this proposition we automatically have a model for the multiplicative fragment of intuitionistic linear logic. In fact one can get the additive conjunction of intuitionistic linear logic without much further assumption on p : P → T. Suppose that T has finite coproducts;
8 and suppose also that P(0) ∼ = 1 and that the injections X → X +Y and
Proposition 2.4 With these assumptions Dial has finite products.
The terminal object in Dial is the unique relation 1 ←− 0.
Predicate logic
Up to now we have just considered the Dialectica category Dial as a category of propositions and proofs. To handle a basic form of quantification we need to index it over some category to represent the types over which we quantify. The standard Dialectica treatment of quantification comes from an indexing over T itself. Clearly one can define for each I ∈ T a parametrized Dialectica category Dial(I) by carrying I along as a simple parameter throughout. Thus objects are of the form A = (U α ←− X) where α ∈ P(I × U × X); and maps from
are diagrams in the simple slice category 9 of T over I of the form
Thus concretely maps A → B of Dial(I) consist of maps f : I × U → V and
Reindexing along maps in T preserves the structure. So we can put the categories Dial(I) together to get a fibration q : Dial → T.
We study the treatment of the quantifiers in the Dialectica interpretation by asking after the existence of adjoints to reindexing along the projections in the fibration q : Dial → T. This is quite straightforward. Take for simplicity an
and we define ∀ I A by
It is easy to see that these provide the required adjoints.
Theorem 2.5 The fibration q : Dial → T has both left and right adjoints to reindexing along product projections. These adjoints satisfy the Beck-Chevalley condition.
10
One can extend the abstract analysis of the Dialectica interpretation to deal with interpretations of various kinds of type theories.
11 However I leave that for another occasion.
Interpreting intuitionistic logic
The treatment of conjunction and disjunction in the Dialectica interpretation raise quite different issues. So I deal with them separately.
Conjunction and true
It is well known that the tricky point in the original Dialectica interpretation is to get an interpretation for the usual rules for conjunction using the tensor defined above: we want to satisfy the rules
that is, we want canonical proofs of A ∧ A from A and of A from A ∧ B. The problem is that the tensor is certainly not the product in the category and the unit I is not the terminal object. One gets round these two difficulties in rather different ways.
Diagonals
We need a map A → A ⊗ A in Dial. For this additional structure is used. We suppose that p : P → T is equipped with a kind of weak definition by cases. For φ ∈ P(X) and f, g : X → Y in T, we suppose given a map
which we can also write suggestively as if φ then f else g. This construction is supposed to have the following properties.
• (Naturality on right.) If u : Z → X, then
• (Naturality on left.
• (Identity rule.) cases(φ, f, f ) = f .
• (Cases condition.) For all ψ ∈ P(Y ),
Observation 1. In the traditional view cases(φ, f, g) depends on the decidability of predicates in P. We think of it as arising in the following way. There is an object bool (of booleans) with 1 → bool acting as a classifier of predicates in P; so there is a natural isomorphism P(X) ∼ = T(X, bool). Further bool ∼ = 1 + 1 is a coproduct, so we can construct cases(φ, f, g) : X → Y as the composite
The condition bool ∼ = 1 + 1 corresponds to the decidability of the core predicates of the Dialectica interpretation together with the existence of characteristic functions for them.
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Observation 2. The conditions above are, however, all we really use to define the (diagonal) comultiplication map. One can find examples of them with no connection with decidability. For example if we took for T a category of Scott domains and continuous maps and for P(X) the Scott open subsets of the domain X, then we could define
It is easy to see that this will satisfy the conditions we set on our weak definition by cases.
Given a notion of definition by cases, cases(φ, f, g), or if φ then f else g, we define for
The following properties are easy to establish.
• ∆ l is a coassociative comultiplication: that is, the diagram
commutes. This is a simple consequence of the properties we supposed for our weak definition by cases. There is however no counit for the comultiplication (see the discussion of projections below).
• ∆ l is not natural with respect to all maps; but it is natural with respect to 'information preserving' maps, that is, those of the form
• Composing ∆ l with the twist map A ⊗ A → A ⊗ A gives an alternative comultiplication ∆ r . This is the familiar symmetric choice of Dialectica interpretation of A ⊢ A ∧ A.
Projections Again we need something extra, but that something is rather dull. We ask for inhabited types, or more exactly for a choice of element x 0 ∈ X for each X ∈ T. Then we have A → I given by
This counit is not natural, and there are no good connections between it and the comultiplication. The counit gives projections fst : A ⊗ B → A and snd : A ⊗ B → B: 13 here fst is natural in A and snd in B. The maps fst and snd are interchanged by the twist giving rise to equations like fst.∆ l = snd.∆ r ; but there are no really significant mathematical properties.
Disjunction and false
To interpret disjunction one needs some kind of coproduct in Dial. To give this assume that there is an object bool ∈ T (of Booleans) with maps 1 true −→ bool and 1 false −→ bool such that the induced map P(bool × X) → P(X) × P(X) is an isomorphism.
Then we define the (weak) sum
2 is given by the pair (α(u, x), β(v, y)): we might suggestively write
We get the following properties.
• The operation + extends to give a functor Dial × Dial → Dial. As so often occurs with weak coproducts, this functor is not associative.
• There is a natural codiagonal ∇ : A + A → A given by
where fth projects onto X, and
and where choose is bool×U ×U ∼ = U ×U +U ×U −→ U . The naturality is easy to check.
Had we not commited ourselves to considering inhabited types in our discusion of projections, we would find that if T has an initial object 0, then the unique relation 0 ←− X is initial in Dial for any X ∈ T. With inhabited types however we are restricted to a weak initial object
This provides an interpretation for intuitionistic falsity, but there is no naturality, nor any good properties with respect to the weak coproduct. Even ⊥+A ∼ = A fails. It follows that we have separately to give injections to interpret the rules
We define in l : A → A + B and in r : B → A + B by
are the identity. And notwithstanding that in l is not natural we have that the composite
The Dialectica interpretation is usually taken at the level of provability. We can understand the fact that at that level the interpretation with inhabited types interprets constructive logic as follows.
Theorem 2.6
The poset reflection of our indexed category Dial → T of proofs is a 'first-order hyperdoctine': we get indexed Heyting algebras and good quantification.
Of course the interpretation applies to arithmetic and stronger systems, and we have not accounted abstractly for those aspects.
3 The Diller-Nahm Variant I now give a categorical analysis of the interpretation introduced by Diller and Nahm in [15] . One value of the categorical approach is that when one strips interpretations of their coding component one gets a fresh perspective on their mathematical content. What is usually called the Diller-Nahm variant of the Dialectica Interpretation is a striking example of this. The description of it as a 'variant' fails utterly to give credit to the elegant mathematical structure of this interpretation.
The Diller-Nahm Category
Suppose again that we have a pre-ordered set fibration p : P → T, providing for each type I ∈ T a collection of (possibly non-standard) predicates P(I) over I. We need some additional structure. We suppose that p : P → T is equipped with a commutative monoid (−)
• in the following sense.
• First T is a category with products and (−)
• is a strong monad on T such that each algebra is equipped naturally with the structure of a commutative monoid.
• Secondly we suppose that we have an indexed extension of (−)
• to P. For φ ∈ P(I × A) we have φ
• ∈ P(I × X • ).
14 For each I ∈ T, the strength gives an action of (−)
• on the (simple slice) category T I . And the operation φ → φ
• just described is an extension of this to the global category P I → T I .
The example to have in mind here is the finite multiset monad on the category of sets; of course that is exactly the monad whose algebras are commutative monoids. This monad extends naturally to the subset lattices: if
From the data just described we construct a new category Dill = Dill(p) which we again regard as a category of propositions and proofs.
• The objects of Dill are still pairs U, X ∈ T together with α ∈ P(U × X).
We continue to use the notation introduced for Dial.
• Maps of Dill from A = (U
That is they consist of maps f : U → V and
In accord both with the basic example and with the traditional formulation of the interpretation (see for example Diller [14] ) we read this as ∀x ∈ F (u, y).α(u, x) ⊢ β(f (u), y) .
• The identity on A = (U α ←− X) is given by
and with η the unit for the monad (−)
• .
• Composition of maps A → B and B → C, that is of
Here we use a construction familiar from models for the computational lambda calculus. If
So the composite is indeed a map A → C of Dill.
Again it is straightforward to check the associativity and identity laws so we get the following.
Proposition 3.1 Dill is a category.
Let us call Dill the Diller-Nahm category. It encapsulates the basic mathematical structure of the Diller-Nahm variant of the Dialectica interpretation. We investigate what properties the category Dill has under some natural assumptions.
Natural structure

Propositional Logic
To define Dill we used a strong monad (−)
• on p : P → T. Now we make our usual assumption that T is cartesian closed, and that P → T models ⊤, ∧, → logic. In addition we assume (as we did to get the product in Dial) that T has finite coproducts and that we have natural isomorphisms P(0) ∼ = 1 , and P(X + Y ) ∼ = P(X) × P(Y ) , the latter induced by the injections. Finally we assume the natural isomorphisms of commutative monoids 0
• ∼ = 1 , and (X + Y )
the latter again induced by the injections.
Theorem 3.2 With the above assumptions, Dill is a cartesian closed category.
Proof. We give details of the structure. The categorical product of the objects
The terminal object is the unique predicate
We leave the details of the adjunction to the reader.
What this result shows is that with the Diller-Nahm variant, the ⊤, ∧, → fragment of intuitionistic logic automatically gets an interpretation simply because Dill is a cartesian closed category. One can regard the fact that the natural deduction view of proof and the Diller-Nahm interpretation both give rise to cartesian closed categories as a delightful confirmation of the intuitions behind the interpretation as described for example in the introduction to Diller [14] .
Weak coproducts Note first that if T has an initial object 0 then Dill has an initial object (0 ←− 0). (In fact all objects of the form (0 ←− X) are isomorphic in Dill!)
We can define a weak coproduct A ⊞ B of the objects A = (U α ←− X) and (The basic point is that wherever we might not be sure how to define a map, we have a canonical choice of the identity for multiplication in a standard commutative monoid provided by (−)
• to help us out.) This gives ⊞ the structure of a weak coproduct in the following sense. There is a natural retraction
Predicate Logic
Just as we did for Dial, we can consider Dill as a category fibred over T. 
in the simple slice category. Thus maps of Dill(I) consist of maps f : I ×U → V and F : I × U × Y → X in T such that the entailment above which we read intuitively as ∀x ∈ F (i, u, y).
Reindexing along maps in T preserves the structure defined above. This gives us a fibration q : Dill → T.
We study the the quantifiers in the Diller-Nahm interpretation by asking after the existence of adjoints to reindexing along projections in q : Dill → T. This goes through exactly as for the case of Dial. Take an object A = (U α ←− X) in Dill(I). We have the two definitions
Theorem 3.3 The fibration q : Dill → T has both left and right adjoints to reindexing along product projections. These adjoints satisfy the Beck-Chevalley condition.
Again one can extend the abstract analysis of the Diller-Nahm variant to deal with interpretations of various kinds of type theories.
The properties of the Diller-Nahm variant are already so good at the level of proofs that there is no point in stating a theorem at the level of provability. These good properties suggest that it is more flexible than Gödel's original interpretation. This seems to be confirmed by recent work of Burr [6] ; it would certainly be interesting to have an abstract analysis of the interpretation of set theory studied by Burr.
Coding Classical Proof
I rehearse here some background to double-negation translations. There are any number of ways to prove the following basic limitative result. (This is folklore generally associated with Joyal, but I include a proof as I have no ready reference.) Proposition 4.1 Suppose that C is a cartesian closed category with initial object 0. (i) Any object of the form ¬A = (A ⇒ 0) is a subobject of 1; and the subcategory of such objects forms a boolean algebra.
(ii) If ¬¬A ∼ = A for all A ∈ C then C is equivalent to boolean algebra.
Proof. First since − × A is a left adjoint, 0 × A ∼ = 0. Secondly
is a pullback; and applying this to 0 → 1 and 0 → A we deduce that
is a pullback and hence that 0 → A is monic. So in particular 0 → 1 is monic.
So as (−)
A is a right adjoint, 0 A → 1 A ∼ = 1 is monic. This shows each ¬A is a subobject of 1. Now the subobjects of 1 form a poset modelling ⊤, ∧, → logic and with a (strict 15 ) initial object modelling ⊥. The subobjects of the form ¬A, are the regular subobjects; and they automatically form a boolean algebra. Finally if ¬¬A ∼ = A, then every object is a regular subobject of 1 and C is equivalent to a boolean algebra.
It seems possible that if we weaken (ii) of the above by asking perhaps oddly that ¬¬A be a retract of A, we may get models with interesting proof theory.
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I should like to have a compelling example.
Double negation translations
Here I briefly explain the mathematical context in which we can most simply explain some double negation translations. The ideal set-up is this. Suppose we have a cartesian closed category C with finite sums. Take any R ∈ C. We can identify two 'double negation categories'.
• The full subcategory R C of C on those objects A = R A = (A ⇒ R) which are powers of R.
• The Kleisli category C R for the double negation monad (− ⇒ R) ⇒ R. 15 Strictness of 0 is not really needed but is easy: if X → 0 take the product of it and 0 → 1 to get the pullback
16 After all in the constructive setting, realizability certainly has interest despite its crude treatment of negated formulae.
Observe that
Thus R C ≃ (C R ) op , and the categories are opposites of one another.
Theorem 4.2 R C is a cartesian closed category with weak finite coproducts; and for each object A ∈ R C there is a natural retraction A ⊳ ¬¬A in R C where
Proof. This is well known, and I just give the structure for completeness.
Terminal Object
The basic properties are routine. The only point worth stressing is that the weak coproduct ⊞ is not functorial, but rather carries premonoidal structure in the sense of Power and Robinson [34] .
Both the categories R C and C R model some form of classical proof theory. They can be regarded as corresponding to different choices in the cut elimination process. One can express this in terms of computation paradigms for Parigot's λµ-calculus (see Parigot [32] ). A precise connection was given by Hofmann and Streicher [24] . As explained in detail by Selinger [37] , R C corresponds to the call-by-name λµ-calculus, and C R to the call by value. All this is related to the continuation passing style (CPS); however one should be cautious as the basic content of CPS can be analyzed in more primitive terms. Thielecke [41] gives a clear account of the categorical structure of continuation passing in terms of premonoidal structure with a self adjunction; and he is able to handle real programming language features in terms of his formulation. Below we compare the models we construct with Thielecke's notion.
Shoenfield's Version of Dialectica
In his classic text Shoenfield [38] considers an interpretation which he describes in terms of formulae A = ∀u∃xα(u, x). The description is purely formal and it is best for us to regard such a formula as being of the form A = ¬∃u∀xα(u, x). More precisely we take A = (A −• R) in Dial where R = ⊥ = (1 false ←− 1). So A is an object of the double negation category R (Dial). We give a concrete description of this category.
• The objects A of the category are of the form A −• R for A ∈ Dial. Thus formally we have
which we interpret by means of the formulae
• Maps in R Dial from an object
to an object
are given by maps
Since the above expresses exactly the maps in R Dial, these slightly implausible maps compose associatively. 17 Following through the definitions one sees that what we have defined corresponds exactly to Shoenfield's version of the Dialectica interpretation as presented in Shoenfield [38] . This makes precise the observation of Troelstra (see [42] ) that Shoenfield's interpretation results from combining the Dialectica and the double negation translations.
Of course since in Dial we did not start with the ideal situation of a cartesian closed category with coproducts we cannot use the general observations of the previous section to analyze the structure of the category R (Dial). It turns out however that it does have some good structure.
We suppose without further ado that we are in the indexed situation discussed in Section 2.2.2, so we deal with propositional connectives and quantifiers together. We write objects as A = (A −• R), B = (B −• R) and so on. Then we can define the following logical operations.
We make a number of points about how the logic is represented in the categorical structure of R Dial.
1. The falsity ⊥ is a unit for the disjunction ∨. However ∨ is not monoidal.
Rather it is premonoidal in the sense of Power and Robinson [34] . As usual maps A → B of the form R f : R A → R B for f : B → A are central. 3. While A −• B gives a closed structure, the corresponding tensor is missing as R A ⊗ R B is not of the form R C for any C. In fact we can read
We could regard
that is essentially as the Henkin quantified formula 18 ∀u ∃x ∀v ∃y α(u, x) ∧ β(v, y) .
4. We could regard negation ¬A = A −• ⊥ as a derived operation. It is certainly not an involution though we have A a retract of ¬¬A for all A.
The correctness of the definition of universal quantification follows from the natural isomorphisms
where we have not distinguished between R and ∆ Z R.
6. Finally we can consider the opposite category Dial R . We get a premonoidal ∧ dual to ∨ and we get the natural isomorphism
One can compare this with Thielecke's notion of a ⊗¬-category (see Thielecke [41] ). We get much of what Thielecke requires, but ∧ is emphatically not a product in the centre of Dial R . I do not know if there is (any interest in) a variant of the CPS calculus corresponding to the structure of Dial R . But at least the example shows the independence of the cartesian assumption from some other components of the structure.
Double negation Diller-Nahm
In this section I give a brief description of what we get by applying a generalised double negation translation to the Diller-Nahm interpretation. That is I consider the category R Dill for R = (1 false ←− 1). 19 Again we give a concrete description of the category.
• The objects A of the category are of the form A −• R for A ∈ Dill. Thus formally we have
which we give also in logical notation
• Maps in R Dill from an object
such that an entailment which I write
This notation is ambiguous so I give its interpretation in logical notation.
y) .
I wonder whether anyone has written down this interpretation of implication before.
Since the above describes the maps in the category R Dill there is indeed an associative composition. 20 We are now closer to the ideal situation of Section 4.1 in that Dill is cartesian closed. But it does not have coproducts, so we cannot deduce that R Dill is cartesian closed. Again we suppose that we are in the indexed situation discussed in Section 3.2.2, and deal with propositional connectives and quantifiers together. We write objects of R Dill as A = (A −• R), B = (B −• R) and so on. Then we can define the following logical operations.
We briefly compare the associated categorical structure of R Dill with that of R Dial which we treated in the previous section.
1. Again falsity ⊥ is a unit for the disjunction ∨, and ∨ is not monoidal but premonoidal in the sense of Power and Robinson [34] . Maps A → B of the form R f : R A → R B for f : B → A are central.
2. As before, we can regard A ⇒ B = ¬A ∨ B as a derived operation. It is functorial and we have a natural isomorphism
so A ⇒ B ∼ = ¬A ∨ B is a closed structure on R Dill.
3.
A ⇒ B is a cartesian closed structure in that the corresponding tensor would be a cartesian product; but that product is missing as R A ⊗ R B is not of the form R C for any C. (It is a retract of R A⊞B .) So we do not have a control category in the sense of Selinger [37] . But we are close; for example Thielecke's proof [41] identifying the focal and central maps goes through.
4. Again we can regard negation ¬A = A ⇒ ⊥ as a derived operation; it is not an involution though we have A a retract of ¬¬A for all A.
5. The correctness of the definition of universal quantification is justified exactly as for R Dial.
6. We can consider the opposite category Dill R where we get a premonoidal ∧ dual to ∨ and the natural isomorphism
Now ∧ is a product in the centre of Dill R , so we get an example of a ⊗¬-category in the sense of Thielecke [41] . This is a natural example of the situation where we have the structure analyzed by Thielecke, but simply do not have to hand the additional structure of a co-control category in the sense of Selinger [37] .
Classical Proof
In the previous section I discussed approaches to classical proof theory which depend on some form of the double negation translation. These do not respect the symmetry of classical logic which is expressed in the sequent calculus. It is natural to ask for a direct coding-free formulation of that notion of classical proof implicit in the sequent calculus. As indicated in the introduction, we have then to confront the inherent non-determinism exemplified by cutting weakened formulae: one wants a notion of equality of proof, but this equality cannot be preserved by cut elimination. One obvious idea is to regard a proof as being a non-deterministic choice between the various cut-free proofs to which it reduces. This is a bit crude as just expressed and as yet we have no satisfactory semantics for proofs along these lines. As a prelude to a suggestion as to the shape of such a semantics, I discuss first the basic semantics of the sequent calculus and its relation with Linear Logic. At least this provides an illustration of Categorical Proof Theory in action.
Polycategories
Many years ago Szabo gave a categorical formulation of the core of the sequent calculus in terms of the notion of a polycategory (Szabo [39] ). More recently a number of variants of the basic idea have been considered ( [28] , [29] , [7] , [8] , [5] ). In the last two references one can find a syntactic proof of a conservative extension result: essentially that any polycategory embeds fully and faithfully in the free linearly distributive category which it generates. 21 The proof in particular of faithfulness is really quite involved and makes heavy use of an intricate analysis of proof nets in [5] .
As an illustration of the value of abstract proof theory I give here an abstract category theoretic proof of the result. I shall do this in the simple symmetric case which is the fundamental case for traditional logic, though the reader will see that other versions follow the same lines.
I recall the idea of polycategory. First let us consider a general form of the core of the sequent calculus. Suppose we have a collection of propositions A, B, C, and so on; and suppose further that we have, for sequences Γ, ∆ of propositions, collections of proofs of Γ ⊢ ∆. Suppose finally that this collection of proofs contains identity proofs, is closed under the cut rule and under exchange. So the basic structural rules are
and we have in addition the general rule Γ ⊢ ∆ Exchange σΓ ⊢ τ ∆ where σ and τ are arbitrary permutations. We can model this fragment of proof theory in a symmetric polycategory.
A symmetric polycategory (henceforth just polycategory) P consists in the first instance of the following data.
• A collection obP of objects of P.
• For each pair of finite sequences Γ and ∆ of objects, a collection P(Γ; ∆) of maps from Γ to ∆.
First this data is required to satisfy symmetry conditions corresponding to the exchange rule. 22 Secondly we require the following data.
• For each object A an identity 1 A ∈ P(A; A).
• For each Γ, ∆, A, Π, Σ a composition
This data satisfies identity and associativity laws, compatibly with the symmetries. For details of more or less the same definition and for related ideas, see [39] ), [28] , [7] or [8] .
In [7] and more fully in [8] Cockett and Seely consider the notion of a linearly distributive category. In essence this is a category modelling the positive part of multiplicative linear logic: that is, multiplicative linear logic without the involutive duality. So there are (symmetric) monoidal structures (I, ⊗) and (⊥ 
∆) .
There is a sensible way to make P oly into a 2-functor between the obvious 2-categories: P oly : LinDist → Poly. Conversely given a polycategory P we can freely construct a linearly distributive category LinDist(P) = LinDist P generated as such by the objects of P and by maps ⊗Γ → formulation of all this.) This construction provides a 2-functor LinDist : Poly → LinDist. It is easy to see that one has a 2-adjunction LinDist ⊣ P oly, and one main theorem of Cockett and Seely [8] is the following conservativity result. 22 We can express these conditions as follows. Any pair Γ, ∆ can be regarded as a pair of objects in the free symmetric strict monoidal category on the collection of propositions. Maps in that free category are given by object preserving bijections between the strings. Any such pair of maps σ : Γ → σΓ and τ : ∆ → τ ∆ induces a bijection (σ; τ ) : P(Γ; ∆) → P(σΓ; σ∆). And these bijections compose in the natural way.
Theorem 5.1 In the 2-adjunction LinDist ⊣ P oly the unit P → P oly(LinDist(P)) is full and faithful on each polycategory P.
Fullness can be derived by a cut elimination argument, but the argument for faithfulness given in Cockett and Seely [8] depends on the careful syntactic analysis of Blute, Cockett, Seely and Trimble [5] . Here I explain how the result can be derived purely categorically, essentially by a Yoneda argument. Just as the Yoneda embedding is one of the basic constructions of pure category theory, the embedding described here seems to be a basic one for categorical proof theory.
A bimodule (or plain module as we consider no others) M over P, is a family of sets M(Γ; ∆) satisfying symmetry conditions as for P above, and with natural left actions We also have the notion of representable modules. The left representable module A P is defined by A P(Π; Σ) = P(A, Π; Σ). The right representable module P A is defined by P A (Γ; ∆) = P(Γ; ∆, A).
The envelope
Suppose that P is a polycategory. Define Env(P), the envelope of P, to be the following category.
Proposition 5.2 With the structure just defined Env(P) is a * -autonomous category.
To each object A of P we associate the object γ A : P A × A P → P obtained by composing the right and left representable modules in P. One should think of this object γ A as the operation 'cut on a formula A'. Now any polymap f ∈ P(Γ; ∆) induces an obvious map in Env(P); and γ f depends naturally on f in the obvious sense, so that there is a map of polycategories P → P oly(Env(P)). Then a Yoneda argument shows the following.
Proposition 5.3 For any polycategory P, the map P → P oly(Env(P)) is full and faithful.
We shall refer to the map P → P oly(Env(P)) as the Yoneda embedding for polycategories. One can think of it as suggesting (though after the event) that the basic idea of the sequent calculus gives rise inevitably to multiplicative linear logic.
We observed that Env(P) is * -autonomous and so in particular linearly distributive. Hence by the 2-adjunction we get a map Lindist(P) → Env(P) of linearly distributive categories so that the above Yoneda embedding factors P → P oly(Env(P)) = P → P oly(Lindist(P)) → P oly(Env(P)) through the unit P → P oly(Lindist(P)). As P → P oly(End(P)) is faithful so also is the unit P → P oly(Lindist(P)). This proves the faithful half of Theorem 5.1. 
* -polycategories
To complete the picture I mention the notion of * -polycategory, which models a symmetric form of the sequent calculus.
Suppose we have a collection of propositions A, B, C, and so on, equipped with an involution (−)
⊥ . Suppose further that we have for sequences Γ, ∆ of propositions collections of proofs of Γ ⊢ ∆. Suppose finally that this collection of proofs contains identity proofs and is closed under cut and under exchange as before; and that in addition it is closed under the classical rules for negation.
We can model this fragment of logic in a * -polycategory.
A symmetric * -polycategory (henceforth just * -polycategory) P consists in the first instance of the following data.
• A collection obP of objects of P closed under an involutory negation (−) ⊥ .
This data is required to satisfy conditions corresponding to the exchange rule and the rules for negation. 25 Secondly we require the following data.
This data satisfies identity and associativity laws, compatibly with the symmetries. I omit the details.
Recall that the multiplicative fragment of linear logic corresponds to the notion of a * -autonomous category. It is easy to see that a * -autonomous category A gives rise to a * -polycategory SP oly(A) = SP oly A , where SP oly A (Γ; ∆) = A(⊗Γ, A duality is a contravariant structure and hence neither * Aut nor * Poly are naturally 2-categories; rather they are naturally enriched in groupoids. Then SP oly extends to a groupoid enriched functor SP oly : * Aut → * Poly. Conversely, given a * -polycategory P, we can freely construct a * -autonomous category SAut(P) generated by the objects and polymaps and subject to obvious identifications as before. Then SAut : * Poly → * Aut is a groupoid enriched functor, and we have a groupoid enriched adjunction SAut ⊣ SP oly. There is a corresponding conservativity result.
Theorem 5.4
In the groupoid enriched adjunction SAut ⊣ SP oly, the unit
is full and faithful for any * -polycategory P.
The faithfulness is again a consequence of a Yoneda argument. Env(P) is a * -autonomous category for any polycategory P. If P is itself a * -polycategory then A → (γ A : P A × A P → P) is a map of * -polycategories P → SP olyEnv(P). Then the same Yoneda argument as before gives the following proposition.
Proposition 5.5 For any * -polycategory P, the map P → SP olyEnv(P) is full and faithful. 25 We can express these conditions as follows. Any pair Γ, ∆ gives us a sequence Γ ⊥ , ∆ which we can regard as an object in the free symmetric strict monoidal category on the collection of propositions. Maps in that free category are given by object preserving bijections between the strings. Each such map σ : Γ ⊥ , ∆ → Π ⊥ , Σ induces a map σ * : P(Γ; ∆) → P(Π; Σ). And these compose in the natural way. This is the Yoneda embedding for * -polycategories. Now for any * -polycategory P, the groupoid enriched adjunction gives a map SAut(P) → Env(P) of * -autonomous categories so that the Yoneda embedding factors P → SP olyEnv(P) = (P → SP olySAut(P) → SP olyEnv(P) through the unit P → SP olySAut(P). As P → SP olyEnv(P) is full and faithful, so also is the unit P → SP olySAut(P). This proves the faithful part of Theorem 5.4. 26 
Modelling Classical Sequent Calculus
I now describe in outline an approach to the semantics of proofs in the classical sequent calculus which is intended to be faithful to its essential mathematical structure. This approach comes from a consideration of the system for annotating proofs developed by Bierman and Urban and analyzed in detail in Urban's PhD dissertation [45] . The papers [46] and [47] give a compressed account of some of the work.
So what should we regard as the essential mathematical structure of the sequent calculus? The basic idea is surely that we compose proofs by cuts. If we think of this as plugging proof modules together, the order of the plugging should not matter and we expect at least to identify sequent calculus proofs up to naturally commuting cuts. Thus we expect there to be a * -polycategory C of propositions and classical proofs. We start with the following intuitions.
• We should identify proofs up to commutative conversions as is the basic idea of proof nets.
• The key step of cut elimination, that of eliminating logical a cut at a critical formula, should be regarded as unproblematic and performing such a cut should leave the meaning of a proof unchanged.
• More generally we expect to identify proofs when the cut elimination process transforms a cut in only one way. However when the cut elimination process has a choice we get no identification.
27
Now the * -polycategory C will contain a core category C of propositions and proofs. Clearly C must (in some sense) be equipped with the structure, true, and, false, or, not of classical logic: we write this structure as 1, ∧, 0, ∨ and (−) ⊥ , the last being the involutory negation. The critical question is whether or not polymaps in C are represented in C by ∧ and ∨: that is, in effect, whether or not C is a * -autonomous category 26 Again the full result will follow from a more complex argument following Lafont. 27 Many have had the obvious thought to regard the proof as a non-deterministic choice between the two results; but without careful caveats that is not faithful to the dynamics of proofs. In any case what is proposed here is more innocent in that it makes no preemptive assumptions about meaning.
with SP oly(C) ∼ = C. 28 The idea that we have SP oly(C) ∼ = C seems appealing in terms of mathematical elegance, so let us see what it means. It amounts requiring that proofs of Γ, A ∧ B ⊢ ∆ coincide with proofs of Γ, A, B ⊢ ∆, or dually whether proofs of Γ ⊢ A ∨ B, ∆ coincide with proofs of Γ ⊢ A, B, ∆. Suppose we start (for example) with a proof of Γ, A, B ⊢ ∆, form from it a proof of Γ, A ∧ B ⊢ ∆ in the obvious way, and then cut that with the simple proof of A, B ⊢ A ∧ B. Then our intuition is surely that we are back where we started. 29 However it is not quite so plausible that all proofs of Γ, A ∧ B ⊢ ∆ are (equivalent to) ones deriving directly from proofs of Γ, A, B ⊢ ∆. Indeed some computational intuition is against that.
We can look at the issue from another point of view. Note that given proofs A ⊢ f B and C ⊢ g D, there is a canonical proof A ∧ C ⊢ f ∧g B ∧ D given by the following
Similarly we have f ∨g a proof of A∨C ⊢ B ∨D. Thus we have operations ∧ and ∨ on maps and the question then is whether or not these operations on maps are functorial. If we take the full range of possibilities in the sequent calculus seriously then simple experiments will show that making ∧ and ∨ functorial would force us to identify proofs which are intuitively distinct; so we should not assume functoriality. Now if ∧ and ∨ represent multimaps then they will be functorial. 30 So by the same token ∧ and ∨ should not represent multimaps. Suppose we agree that ∧ and ∨ are not be functorial on C: then we are left with the question of exactly what properties these operations should have. Since the problems arise out of the structural rules, it seems natural to require that linear proofs should play a special role. So without further ado, here is a modest proposal for the abstract definition of a semantics for classical proof. A static model for classical propositional logic consists of the following data.
• An identity on objects faithful functor L → C. (We think of C as being a category of propositions and classical proofs; and of L as being a subcategory of the same propositions but with linear proofs.)
• The structure of a * -autonomous category on L. We write the structure as 1, ∧, 0, ∨ and the involution as (−) ⊥ .
• An extension of (−) ⊥ to an involution on C.
28 Of course we cannot have C * -autonomous and the diagonal A ⊢ A ∧ A and codiagonal A ∨ A ⊢ A natural. For then C would be a self dual cartesian closed category and so by Proposition 4.1 a Boolean algebra. 29 Thus, despite the difficulties we are about to discuss, it seems possible to give a model in purely categorical rather than polycategorical terms. 30 With natural assumptions there is in fact a converse.
kind of algebraic structure in a suitable enriched setting. 32 The definition is certainly crude in one probably inessential respect: it fails to account for the intuition that a proof Γ ⊢ ∆ may be linear in some arguments and not in others. However the main problems relate to semantics. I am still trying to find a nontrivial natural mathematical semantics, so for that if no other reason the value of the suggestion must be in doubt.
The key features of the definition are that ∧ and ∨ are not functorial with respect to all maps, and that the diagonal A → A ∧ A and multiplication A ∨ A → A are not natural with respect to all maps. The second of these 'negative' features does not seem too bad. However the existence of an extension of ∧ and ∨ to all maps natural with respect to composition with linear maps, but not generally functorial seems beyond the scope of current models.
Let us review the situation in the language of polycategories. We distinguish between linear and classical proofs in the sequent calculus. Thus we expect to have two * -polycategories, one L of linear proofs and the other C of classical proofs. There will be an embedding L → C. Now we aim for some relation between the initial category theoretic model L → C and L → C. Cut elimination is unproblematic for linear logic, and this finds expression in the natural L(Γ, ∆) ∼ = L(∧∆, ∨Γ). We can read this as saying L ∼ = SP oly(L). It would be mathematically appealing to ask also that C be * -autonomous with C ∼ = SP oly(C). Prima facie there is nothing to say against this. Models given by a * -autonomous embedding L → C would be relatively easy to understand. Unease arises from the fact that this simple idea conflicts with some kind of (admittedly tenuous) computational intuition about the sequent calculus. The alternative suggestion made here, roughly based on a proof theoretic analysis ( [46] and [47] ), is perhaps equally unsatisfactory in that we have no good mathematical models.
We began the paper with reflections on the contrast between philosophical and mathematical ways of giving semantic motivation for a theory of proofs; but I have focussed throughout on mathematical motivation arising from elegance of structure. So it is instructive that our brief look at a possible semantics for classical proof finds tension between different kinds of mathematical motivation. Such tension may not be easy to resolve at the technical level. But if that means we need a better conceptual analysis, we shall I fear be falling back on philosophical motivation in the last resort.
